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AFTER THE ARGENTINE CRISIS:
CAN THE IMF PREVENT CORRUPTION IN ITS
LENDING? A MODEL APPROACH
Juan Carlos Linares
"Corruption hurts the poor disproportionately-by diverting
funds intended for development, undermining a government's ability to
provide basic services, feeding inequality and injustice, and discourag-
ing foreign investment and aid.
INTRODUCTION
Argentina has recently been a hotbed of economic, social and
political disagreement. Once heralded as nation of rags to riches im-
migrants in Buenos Aires and spirited gauchos in the wide-open
Pampa, it has now been relegated to a global example of fiscal irre-
sponsibility in government and international lending.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF), a leading character
in the unfolding Argentine saga, has also come under harsh criticism
from scholars who argue that its lending policies have failed miserably
to correct the economic conditions that it has sought to improve. Jef-
fery Sachs himself has labeled the IMF as "the typhoid Mary of emerg-
ing markets."'
Though many valid explanations exist as to the cause of Argen-
tina's financial collapse, without a doubt, a major reason is the corrup-
tion afflicting many of the institutions for decades. In Argentina
alone, "the level of corruption that persists is staggering in scope" and
"involves enormous sums of money.'"
* Kofi Annan, United Nations Secretary-General, in his statement on the adop-
tion by the General Assembly of the United Nations Convention against Corrup-
tion, at httpJ/www.unodc.org/unodc/crime-convention-corruption.html (last
visited Jan. 30, 2004).
1 Frontline: The Crash: Interview with Jeffrey D. Sachs, at httpJ/www.pbs.org/
wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/crash/etc/script.html (last visited Dec. 13, 2003) [here-
inafter The Crash]. Jeffrey Sachs is the Galen L. Stone Professor of International
Trade at Harvard University and the Director of the Center for International De-
velopment. He has served as an economic advisor to governments in Latin Ameri-
can, Eastern Europe, Russia, Asia and Africa.
2 David Hess and Thomas W. Dunfee, Fighting Corruption: A Principled Ap-
proach; The C2 Principles (Combating Corruption), 33 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 593, 596
(2000) [hereinafter Hess & Dunfee] ("While it is impossible to determine the cur-
rent precise level of coarse bribery, a 1997 World Bank estimate placed the total
corruption involved in international trade at $80 billion per year.").
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This paper focuses on curtailing the corruption inherent in the
lending practices of the IMF and, subsequently, preventing another
economic disaster, as has occurred in Argentina. In fact, if the IMF
will succeed in future attempts to restore a state's monetary and fiscal
standing, it should incorporate language of the accounting and record-
keeping provisions of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act into its
loan agreement policies, thereby conditioning its loans upon trans-
parency and good governance over borrowed funds.
Part I of this article introduces corruption and its affect on in-
ternational lending. Part II describes the IMF and its mandates, and
illustrates its role in the recent economic problems in Argentina. Part
III outlines accounting provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(FCPA) and demonstrates its potential effectiveness in curbing corrup-
tion on an international scale. Part IV concludes, as the paper begins,
with the notion that the IMF will better serve its function as interna-
tional lender when it deals directly with the problem of corruption in-
herent in its loans.
Transparency International, in its 2003 Corruption Percep-
tions Index, ranked Argentina 92 of 133 countries according to how
corruption is perceived to exist among public officials and politicians. 3
With this knowledge, the IMF poured funds into the country through-
out the 1990's to the present. Not surprisingly, much of this money
went not to the planned economic austerity programs, but rather to
the private coffers of many Argentine politicians and officials. In fact,
in one provincial city, the Argentine mayor "built an office that resem-
bled a scaled-down presidential country house before being convicted
in 2000 of misappropriating public funds and threatening a former city
official."'' As a result of these practices, many in the region feel that
years of IMF assistance and "economic liberalization have done little
to alleviate poverty, and they have little trust in their leaders to carry
3 Press Release, Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2003
(Oct. 7, 2003) at http://www.transparency.org/pressreleases-archive/2003/2003.10.
07.cpi.en.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2003); see also Walter Perkel, Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 683, 711 (2003) ("Perhaps the most influential
actor in civil society with regard to anti-corruption efforts is Transparency Inter-
national."); see generally Transparency International Mission Statement, at http://
www.transparency.org/about-ti/mission.html (last visited Dec. 13, 2003) ("TI is
the only organization devoted solely to diminishing corruption in the international
commercial arena, where it promotes the principles of decentralization, participa-
tion, diversity, accountability, and transparency in an effort to foster preventative
measures against corruption.").
4 Matt Moffett, One Tough Mayor Shows Argentina How To Clean House, WALL
ST. J., July 1, 2003, at Al. Since the economic collapse, there are "small but grow-
ing number of Latin American leaders fighting the region's deeply embedded cor-
ruption at the local level."
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out reforms without lining their own pockets."' Even the most well-
meaning of IMF plans has been undermined by corruption.'
Consequently, the IMF should strive for accountability, not
only its lending practices but also the borrowers' use of funds for
stated purposes. A key component of this is transparency. "A regula-
tion or law is to be transparent if the process and the effects of the
regulation or law can been [sic] seen through easily, just as one can see
easily through a clean window."7 Accordingly, the IMF would be wise
to establish transparency by following the path of its funds to assure
the successful execution of programs and, ultimately, to achieve its
mandate.
INTERNATIONAL LENDING FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
In recent years, international lending has increased exponen-
tially in dollar amounts, with the IMF at the forefront of this relatively
new practice. Argentina serves as an example, however, of interna-
tional lending practices leading to economic, political, and social insta-
bility at national levels.
The International Monetary Fund
The IMF was created when twenty-nine countries signed its
Articles of Agreement on December 27, 1945.8 "It was established to
promote international monetary cooperation, exchange stability and
orderly exchange arrangements, to foster economic growth and high
levels of employment, and to provide temporary financial assistance to
countries to help ease balance of payments adjustment."9 Addition-
5 David Luhnow et al., Latin America's Season of Discontent, WALL ST. J., Oct. 16,
2003, at A21.
6 id.
7 William B. T. Mock, An Interdisciplinary Introduction to Legal Transparency: A
Tool for Rational Development, 18 DicK. J. INT'L L. 293, 295 (2000). -If someone
subject to the law can understand what is expected of her, can understand and
comply with the commands of the law, and can foresee the consequences of compli-
ance or non-compliance, then the law is transparent. If not, then the law is
opaque.-
Barbara Crutchfield George and Kathleen A. Lacey, A Coalition of Industrial-
ized Nations, Developing Nations, Multilateral Development Banks, and Non-Gov-
ernmental Organizations: A Pivotal Complement to Current Anti-Corruption
Initiatives, 33 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 547, 577 (2000) [hereinafter George & Lacey];
see also International Monetary Fund, About the IMF, at httpJ/www.imf.org/exter-
nal/about.htm. (last visited Dec. 13, 2003) [hereinafter About IMF].
9 About IMF, supra note 8. The IMF is an international organization of 184 mem-
ber countries.
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ally, the IMF provides the machinery for consultation and collabora-
tion on international monetary problems.'°
The IMF is a multilateral institution, headquartered in Wash-
ington D.C.,"1 controlled by the U.S. and other industrial countries. It
was established to help member countries maintain agreed exchange
rates. 2 The IMF uses its own mechanisms to ensure stability in in-
ternational exchange rates. One such mechanism is surveillance.
Surveillance entails maintaining "a dialogue with its member coun-
tries on the national and international consequences of their economic
and financial policies." 3 These activities have instilled a reputation of
the IMF as a "global watchdog, suitably positioned to determine when
and where a financial crisis may occur."14
In its modern existence, the IMF has used its mandate to in-
fuse capital into troubled economies, "thereby acting as a catalyst to
restore private sector confidence in the system and attract investment
to the economy.""5 Indeed, in the last two decades, the IMF has en-
gaged in several well-publicized bailouts, including those in Mexico,
Thailand, South Korea, and Indonesia.1 6 During this period the IMF
has emerged as an international lender of last resort, commanding
sizeable resources due to support from the G-7 countries. 17
The IMF has also, in turn, leveraged its loans to achieve re-
forms, both macro and micro, in debtor countries."8 It "imposes condi-
10 Articles of Agreement of the IMF, Dec. 27, 1945, art. 1, 60 Stat. 1401, 2 U.N.T.S.
39, available at http://www.imf.org/externa/pubs/ft/aa/index.html (last visited
Dec. 14, 2003) [hereinafter IMF Articles].
" George & Lacey, supra note 8, at 577. The IMF boasts a staff of over 2600
individuals drawn from 122 different countries.
12 HAL S. SCOTT AND PHILLIP A. WELLONS, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 11 (10th ed.
2003) [hereinafter ScoTT & WELLONS]; see also John V. Paddock, IMF Policy and
the Argentine Crisis, 34 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 155, 157 (2002) (noting that
"[alt present, the United States dominates the IMF decision-making process, with
Japan and Europe also weighing in.").
13 International Monetary Fund, IMF Surveillance, at http://www.imf.org/exter-
nal/np/exr/facts/surv.htm (last visited Dec. 14, 2003).
14 George & Lacey, supra note 8, at 577.
15 Id. (citing About IMF, supra note 8); see generally Tom Petruno, The Financial
"White Knight": IMF Demystified, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1997, at Al ("The IMF
funding pool is the sum of subscriptions by the IMF's 182 member nations, which
essentially keep a share of their national currencies on deposit with the IMF. The
IMF deals only with a recipient country's central bank, feeding money directly into
that institution and thus bolstering the financial reserves ultimately backing the
government.").16 George & Lacey, supra note 8, at 577.
17 SCOTT & WELLONS, supra note 12, at 1339. Notwithstanding the fact that the
IMF cannot print its own currency.
18 Id. at 1342.
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tions on borrowing governments that frequently involve raising taxes
and interest rates and cutting government bureaucracy and social
spending."' 9 This approach has been popularized by the term the
"Washington consensus," promoting a set of Western "economic
dogma" focused on economic liberalization and characterized by dis-
credit of the state and praise of free markets.2 °
As a creditor, the IMF has the authority to insist that the ap-
plicant country "adopt institutional reform measures intended to elim-
inate corrupt practices which undermine economic stability."2 1 The
recent bailouts in developing countries "focused global attention on the
potential influence of the IMF in 'promoting good governance in all its
aspects, improving the efficiency and accountability of the public sec-
tor, and tackling corruption.""2  As a consequence, in 1997, the IMF
implemented seemingly competent guidelines to "promote public sec-
tor transparency and accountability. 2 3
The guidelines were meant to "improve efficiency and support
sustained economic growth" by using a "'more proactive approach in
advocating policies' and actively [pursuing] 'the development of insti-
tutions and administrative systems that aim to eliminate the opportu-
nity for corruption [and] fraudulent activity in the management of
19 Paddock, supra note 12, at 172. These reforms may lead to higher unemploy-
ment rates or reduced government salaries in debtor countries.
20 Luis Banck, International Monetary Fund: Distributional Impacts of IMF-Sup-
ported Economic Reforms: A Case Study of Mexico, 3 GEO. PUBLIC POL'Y REV. 115
(1998).
21 George & Lacey, supra note 8, at 577.
22 Id. at 578 (quoting International Monetary Fund, IMF Adopts Guidelines Re-
garding Governance Issues (Aug. 4. 1997), at httpJ/www.imf.org/external/np/sec/
nb/1997/NB9715.htm (last visited Dec. 14, 2003) [hereinafter Guidelines]).
2 Guidelines, supra note 22 ("As regards possible individual instances of corrup-
tion, IMF staff should continue raising these with the authorities in cases where
there is a reason to believe they could have significant macroeconomic implica-
tions, even if these effects are not precisely measurable. Such implications could
arise either because the amounts involved are potentially large, or because the
corruption may be symptomatic of a wider governance problem that would require
changes in the policy or regulatory framework to correct. Instances could include,
for example, the diversion of public funds through misappropriation, tax (includ-
ing customs) fraud with the connivance of public officials, the misuse of official
foreign exchange reserves, or abuse of powers by bank supervisors that could en-
tail substantial future costs for the budget and public financial institutions. Cor-
rupt practices could also occur in other government activities, including the
regulation of private sector activities that do not have a direct impact on the
budget or public finances, such as ad hoc decisions made in relation to the regula-
tion of foreign direct investment. Such practices would be counter to the IMF's
general policy advice aimed at providing a level playing field to foster private sec-
tor activity.").
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public resources."' 2 4 Furthermore, the guidelines seek to achieve "'an
evenhanded treatment of governance issues in all member countries,''enhanced collaboration with other multilateral institutions, in partic-
ular the World Bank' and an improved 'use of complementary areas of
expertise [among anti-corruption initiatives]."1 5 With its 1997 guide-
lines, the IMF purportedly has significant leverage to "require devel-
oping nations reduce internal corruption."2 6
Incidentally, the IMF policy of subjecting borrower nations to
its conditions has sparked debate between those who see a borrower
country's political institutions as unduly susceptible to Western eco-
nomic ideals, and others who believe that, "if the IMF did not lend, the
government would be unable to implement reforms. ' '1 7 In the end,
however, there is little evidence that IMF conditions, usually requiring
contradictory fiscal and monetary policies, have worked.2" IMF condi-
tionality has been extended substantially beyond traditional macro
policy with little proof of success in reducing debt crisis.2 9
For instance, the Washington consensus assumes a "one size
fits all" policy, which "holds that there is only one path for develop-
ment, and only one way for a government to organize its economy and
society."'  As one commentator notes, "this approach is ethnocentric
and undermines other non-financial value" and "[als a result, there
have been profound dislocations around the world, as governments
dismantle universal entitlements and social safety nets to fit the IMF's
very narrow conception of sound finance."3 Likewise, in November
1998, the U.S. Congress' International Financial Institutions Advisory
Commission, in considering the future roles of international financial
institutions, including most prominently the IMF, ruled in favor of
ending IMF long-term lending tied to policy conditions.3 2
Argentina and the IMF
"Argentina captured the title for the largest sovereign default
when it defaulted on its $141 billion external debt in late December
2001.""3 The default itself was a culmination of years of failed eco-
24 George & Lacey, supra note 8, at 578 (quoting Guidelines, supra note 22).
:' Id. at 578 (quoting Guidelines, supra note 22).
26 George & Lacey, supra note 8, at 577-78.
27 SCOTT7 & WELLONS, supra note 12, at 1342.
28 id.
29 Id.
30 Timothy A. Canova, Banking and Financial Reform at the Crossroads of the
Neoliberal Contagion, 14 Am. U. INT'L L. REV. 1571, 1644 (1999).
.31 Id.
32 Sco'rr & WELLONS, supra note 12, at 1345. The Commission was dubbed the
Meltzer Commission for its Chairman, Allan Meltzer.
33 Id. at 1329.
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nomic strategies and what many saw as excessive influence from the
IMF.
In 1991, in a now highly scrutinized decision, the Argentine
government adopted a Currency Board, which fixed the peso equal to
the U.S. dollar.3 4 The government's intent was to make imports
cheaper and to curb inflation, and the initial success of the program
brought much acclaim to the Argentine Ministry of the Economy. 35
The appreciation of the Peso, however, placed exports and domestic
producers at an immediate competitive disadvantage against the inex-
pensive imports. 36
Having received substantial financial assistance from the IMF,
the government was obligated to make periodic repayments. In 1995,
however, Argentina's government recognized that its one to one peg to
the dollar, as well as its new economic liberalizations, had failed to
generate sufficient capital to meet its repayment obligations.3 7 That
year, the government was forced to renegotiate its IMF loan agree-
ment, resulting in a significant decline in the Argentine stock market
and beginning a recurrent pattern "over the next six years, where the
government would deny the gravity of the situation only to capitulate
and lose face shortly thereafter."3
What also followed was a series of new agreements with the
IMF for repayment, conditioning each instance with specific targets
for economic reform.3 " Pressured by the [IF and its member coun-
tries, most notably the U.S., the Argentine government agreed to re-
form labor law and the social security system, in addition to
introducing competition in the energy and telecommunications
sectors.4 °
Consequently, Argentines from all segments of the economy,
including "[blusiness leaders, economists, and trade union leaders,
protested then President Carlos Menem's introduction of tax increases
and spending reductions."4 1 The government, nevertheless, seemed
unable or unwilling to fully comply with the new conditions, yet the
IMF continued to make loans, due perhaps to the institution's unwill-
34 Id. The Peso was pegged to the dollar under the guidance of then Economy
M[inister Domingo Cavallo.
35 Paddock, supra note 12, at 155 ("To the extent the Dollar crept upward in the
1990s in relation to other currencies, the Argentine Peso also began to appreciate
and imports became cheaper.").
.3 Id.
37 Id. at 158-59 (fearing an adverse market reaction, the government denied a
report that it would have to renegotiate IMF loan conditions).
38 Id. at 159.39 SCOTT & WELLONS, supra note 12, at 1330.
40 Id.
41 Paddock, supra note 12, at 162.
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ingness to abandon the failed project and its "expectation of an even-
tual turnaround.", 2
By 1998, Argentines viewed the IMF's bailouts as carried out to
protect the affluent, whose bad investments were repaid with IMF
loan money at the expense of the poor, who ultimately absorbed the
costs of the "austerity programs installed to pay for those loans."4 3 At
the time, one third of the Argentine population was living below the
poverty line and there was fourteen percent unemployment. Although
the IMF countries were satisfied with the loan conditions, Argentine
government workers and the working class erected roadblocks to pro-
test the rising unemployment rate and potential IMF austerity mea-
sures.4 4 Mass protests lead to one death and several injuries during
anti-IMF riots.45
By late 2000, with Argentines already humbled by foreign criti-
cism of their circumstance, the IMF was planning new loans to the
country in excess of $15 billion.4 6 Talks on extra funding stalled, how-
ever, and it became evident to the IMF and its member countries that
it had "not assign[ed] systemic risk to the crisis."4 7
Then the collapse occurred. The government, in a panic to re-
serve currency, limited bank depositors to 2,000 Peso withdrawals per
month from current accounts and froze withdrawals from accounts in
dollars altogether.4 ' The government also controlled transfers of
funds out of Argentina, reduced the interest payments on $45 billion of
government bonds held by local investors, made local banks roll over
$360 million in Treasury bills, and seized assets of pension funds in
order to avoid a formal default on public debt.49  By the end of 2002,
42 id.
43 Id. at 166-68 (Similarly, "after the Asian crisis, George Soros remarked that the
IMF responded by saving many economies from default, but in the process, it effec-
tively "bailed out foreign investors who had speculated in their unsustainable
growth."); see also The Crash, supra note 1.
44 Paddock, supra note 12, at 169. "Changes in IMF policies have forced investors
to share more of the risk but this has only resulted in higher lending costs."
45 Id. at 156. Concurrent with the renegotiations, significant deficits existed be-
cause of large "pension systems, large grants to regional governments, corruption,
and an inefficient, subsidized private sector."
116 Id. at 171-72. "In a widely publicized remark, United States Secretary of the
Treasury Paul O'Neill insulted the Argentine people by seeming to equate their
nation's importance to Uganda's. Alan Greenspan, in an appearance before Con-
gress, referred to the Argentine crisis as domestic in nature."
47 Id. supra note, at 176.
18 SCOTT & WELLONS, supra note 12, at 1329.
49 T
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an estimated fifty percent of the population was below the official pov-
erty level. 50
The IMF was immediately blamed for contributing to the de-
fault.5 1 In retrospect, many critics believe "the IMF [was] too rigid in
demanding policies that the government [could not] accomplish," 2
while others hold that "the IMF was too lenient and let Argentina con-
tinually ignore the loan conditions."5 3
Undoubtedly, a major cause of the collapse resulted from the
steadfast tradition of internal corruption amongst the region's elites.
Indeed, inadequate constraints were adopted to curtail corruption,
where in a nation like Argentina, "traditional distrust of the state led
to disrespect for the rule of law, resulting in corruption and tax eva-
sion." 4 Even now, after the collapse, the Argentine people share the
burden of the new currency limits, while the wealthy transfer funds
out of the country.5 5
During the 1990s, graft grew more visibly than ever as Argen-
tina enjoyed a dramatic increase in investment after embracing the
IMF's free market policies.5 6 Many economists view graft, which
drained government funds and contributed to Argentina's chronic
budget deficits, as an underlying cause of Argentina's financial catas-
trophe. To address chronic budget deficits, the Argentine government
continued borrowing until lenders refused to make additional loans.5 7
In April 2003, Argentina elected Nestor Kirchner its new presi-
dent, by default, with many expecting the nation's economic and finan-
cial woes to turn around.58 In the months since the elections, IMF
50 Id. at 1334.
5 1 Id.
52 Id. at 1329.
5 Paddock, supra note 12, at 179. -A study by the Heritage Foundation found
that in terms of per capita wealth, of the eighty-nine loan recipients from 1965 to
1995, 54% were no better off compared to the time they received the first IMF
installment. Of these countries, 35'r were poorer, of which almost half had econo-
mies which had been reduced by 15-. Moreover, if investor confidence were the
key for a recovering economy, it would seem that limiting corruption would also be
important to the IMF. Yet, the IMF, no less in Argentina than in Russia, Korea,
and Indonesia looked the other way as even the money it loaned was used for
corrupt purposes."
54 Id. at 178.
5 See Id. "In a decade as the IMF's neo-liberal show state, unemployment rose
from 3% to 20%, the number of people in poverty climbed from 200,000 to 5 mil-
lion, and illiteracy grew from 5% to 32% as education and government budgets
were slashed." Id. at 178-79.
.56 Moffett, supra note 4, at AL
57 Id.
58 Scorr & WELLONS, supra note 12, at 1334.
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negotiations had resumed, "GNP was expected to grow 4% in 2003,
inflation was in the single digits, and the peso had risen 20% against
the dollar in four months, forcing the central bank to intervene.
5 9
President Kirchner's priorities have been political legitimacy
and economic growth, as well as a firm stance against IMF repayment
terms and endemic corruption.6 0 His attempts at stamping out cor-
ruption, however, have come under considerable stress, partly because
Peronism, the party to which he belongs, lacks serious opposition, and
is implicated in corrupt financial practices.6 1 The President, at pre-
sent shows no sign of giving in to corruption, "though some Argentines
wonder whether the president really has the stomach to tackle his
party's corrupt old guard. 6 2
President Kirchner's authority comes from his high poll rat-
ings, which he earned by promising to be a crusading reformer.6 3
Meanwhile, the nation is slowly but surely gaining confidence, with a
majority of fifty-three percent saying opening the economy had been
positive, notwithstanding the economic crisis .64
PREVENTING CORRUPTION
"Corruption equals monopoly power plus discretion minus ac-
countability."6 Corruption undoubtedly stems from the government's
" Id. at 1335.
60 Hard or Soft? Brazil, Argentina and the IMF, ECONOMIST, Sept. 27, 2003, at 38;
see also Uruguay's Bold New Oil Policy- Uruguay's Referendum Echoes A Regional
Mood, ECONOMIST, Dec. 13, 2003, at 34 ("Argentina's Nestor Kirchner has de-
manded a big write-down from creditors and threatened to default on loans from
the IMF.").
61 The Mission-Nestor Kirchner's Search For Political Allies, ECONOMIST, Oct. 4,
2003, at 36 [hereinafter The Mission].
62 Id. "If he really intends to shake up his country's politics, he will have to strike
before his aura fades."
63 Id.
64 David Luhnow, Latin America Looks Hard at U.S., WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 2003,
at A15.
65 Brian C. Harms, Holding Public Officials Accountable in the International
Realm: A New Multi-Layered Strategy to Combat Corruption, 33 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 159, 164 (2000) (noting that the causes of corruption are (1) the monopoly
power of the public sector; (2) the discretion of public officials, contingent upon the
control the government has over the economy; and (3) the lack of accountability of
public officials, coinciding with the discretionary power of public officials); see also
Nora M. Rubin, A Convergence of 1996 and 1997 Global Efforts To Curb Corrup-
tion and Bribery in International Business Transactions: The Legal Implications of
The OECD Recommendations and Convention For The United States, Germany,
and Switzerland, 14 AM. U. INT'L. L. REV. 257, 264 (1998) (defining corruption as
the abuse of public office for private gain).
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role in the economy; the greater discretion of public officials within the
state's regulatory framework and the larger the scope of public bene-
fits available to them, give officials more discretion to take advantage
those benefits.6 6 When they are not held accountable, corrupt public
officials may cause a domestic economy to experience enormous finan-
cial losses.6 7
In Argentina, public officials were able to abuse their discre-
tion without any threat of repercussion, as the lack of accountability
and transparency in the government permitted their practices of graft
and corruption to continue undetected.6" Concurrently, the IMF tried
to avoid involvement with Argentina's internal governance.69 "In the
1990s, however, the EIF realized that abstention was no longer a fea-
sible approach to attaining their objectives."7 °
Accordingly, the IMF must forcefully address issues of corrup-
tion to have any chance of success in future financial assistance pro-
grams. The U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act presents a valid model
for securing accountability in financial transactions, and its accept-
ance by other international organizations demonstrates its adaptabil-
ity to institutions like the IMF.
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
The U.S. Congress enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(FCPA) in 1977 as part of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act (SEC).7 1
The FCPA was a response to the heightened awareness of corruption
of the day, from the Nixon presidential scandal to the everyday prac-
tices of bribery in foreign transactions. An admirable initiative creat-
ing criminal penalties for those who corrupt foreign officials, critics
argued that the United States was placed at an immediate, competi-
tive disadvantage with other international trading states in bidding
66 Harms, supra note 65, at 164. Where public officials with monopoly power over
discretionary decisions are not held accountable, they have the incentive to be
corrupt.
6 Id. ("The IMF notes several consequences of corruption: (1) corruption lowers
investment and retards economic growth; (2) corruption misallocates talent; (3)
corruption reduces the effectiveness of aid flows; (4) corruption leads to adverse
budgetary consequences; (5) corruption lowers the quality of the infrastructure
and of public services; and (6) corruption distorts the composition of government
expenditure.").
68 id.
69 Hess & Dunfee, supra note 2, at 604.
70 Id. (claiming that, "[flor example, the World Bank estimated that 20-30% of its
lending to Indonesia went to corrupt officials").
71 15 U.S.C. § 78 dd-1 (1977).
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for third party business.7 2 This criticism chiefly resulted from the
FCPA's more popular provisions criminalizing the bribery of foreign
officials by U.S. corporations and individuals pursuing business in
other countries.7 3 However, the FCPA also required that companies
with publicly-traded stock meet certain standards regarding their ac-
counting practices, books and records, and internal controls.7 4 These
accounting provisions were an attempt to address the broader problem
of corporate concealment of illicit transfer of funds, which businesses
under SEC jurisdiction often had disguised by means of improper ac-
counting procedures.75 Although the language has been made clear in
the years since its inception, "the corporate governance approach em-
bedded in the accounting provisions has remained a part of all subse-
quent legislation."76  The accounting provisions, unlike the anti-
bribery sections, which apply to both "issuers and domestic concerns,"
apply only to "issuers" registered under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934." 7 Essentially, the 1977 Act required every issuer of registered
securities to "(1) make and keep books, records, and accounts which
accurately and fairly reflect, in reasonable detail, transactions and dis-
positions of assets, and (2) devise and maintain a system of internal
accounting. 78
Broad language initially caused confusion about the interpreta-
tion of some of the language used, so the U.S. Congress added clarify-
ing details in the 1988 Amendments by deleting the "reason to know"
standard. 9 "Congress also clarified the corporation's responsibility to
make a 'good faith effort' in the financial record-keeping and internal
accounting controls of foreign subsidiaries in which U.S. companies
have a minority interest."'
The FCPA was again amended in 1998 to implement the Or-
ganization of Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD") Con-
72 Heather Manweiller & Bryan Schwartz, Creating The Free Trade Area Of The
Americas: A Proposal for an Anti-Corruption Dimension to the FTAA, 1 ASPER REV.
INT'L Bus. & TRADE L. 67 (2001) [hereinafter Manweiller & Schwartz].
73 Perkel, supra note 3, at 683.
74 Id.
75 George & Lacey, supra note 8, at 559.
76 Id.
77 15 USCS § 78m(a). Any stock issuer, who engages in interstate commerce or
whose securities are traded on a national stock exchange, who has more than five
hundred shareholders, and whose assets exceed $ 1,000,000 is required to register
its securities with the SEC; see also George & Lacey, supra note 8, at 560.
78 George & Lacey, supra note 8, at 560 (noting that an American company need
be neither foreign nor corrupt to come within the scope of the accounting sections
of the FCPA.)
71 Id. at 561
80 Id. at 562.
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vention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions." The 1998 Amendments ex-
tended the FCPA's jurisdiction beyond America's borders to allow
greater enforcement efforts by U.S. prosecutors, increasing SEC and
Department of Justice ("DOJ") enforcement of the FCPA, and further-
ing the U.S. goal of eradicating corruption in foreign business
practices. s2
Two main aspects of the FCPA's accounting provisions, in par-
ticular, serve as competent models in preventing the type of corruption
experienced in IMF lending. They are the record-keeping provisions
and the internal control provisions.
Record-keeping
The first significant requirement of the accounting provisions
requires all issuers to "make and keep books, records, and accounts,
which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transac-
8' Perkel, supra note 3, at 684: see also Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amend-
ments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 5003, 102 Stat. 1415, 1424 (1988) (request-
ing that the President develop an anti-bribery agreement -with member countries
of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development"); Organization of
Economic Cooperation and Development, OCED Convention on Combating Bribery
of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions: Ratification
Status, at http./www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/53/2406809.pdf (last visited Dec. 16,
2003) [hereinafter OECD Convention]. All thirty OECD countries (Australia, Aus-
tria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and 5
non-signed OECD countries (Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, and Slovenia)
have signed the OECD Convention.
82 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b(2)4A. The 1998 Amendments, adding the OECD, look the
same as those set forth in the 1988 Act: (A) make and keep books, records, and
accounts, which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions
and dispositions of the assets of the issuer; and (B) devise and maintain a system
of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that (i)
transactions are executed in accordance with management's... authorization; (ii)
transactions are recorded . .. in conformity with generally accepted accounting
principles; (iii) access to assets is permitted only in accordance with manage-
ment's... authorization; and (iv) the recorded accountability for assets is com-
pared with the existing assets at reasonable intervals and appropriate action is
taken with respect to any differences; see also Perkel, supra note 3, at 687 (stating
that despite the 1998 amendment, the impact of corruption remains a potent and
debilitating force affecting numerous industries in the international economic
arena); Stuart H. Deming, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: The Accounting and
Record Keeping Provisions, 2002 A.B.A. Sec. Int'l Law & Prac. 1.
26 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 5:1
tions and dispositions of the assets of the issuer." 3 This applies to all
payments of funds, not just those that are material in the traditional
financial meaning. 4 Moreover, the "reasonable detail" requirement
entails keeping a "level of detail and degree of assurance as would sat-
isfy prudent officials in the conduct of their own affairs. ' '
The misconduct that the record-keeping provisions seek to pre-
vent includes: (i) the failure to record illegal transactions; (ii) the falsi-
fication of records to conceal illegal transactions; and (iii) the creation
of records that are quantitatively accurate, but fail to specify qualita-
tive aspects of the transaction. 6 These too are broadly defined, so as
to implicate what may seem as merely isolated incidences of violations.
This undoubtedly serves to heighten the gravity of the measures
involved.
Internal Controls
The FCPA's accounting provisions also require issuers to de-
vise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls that will
provide "reasonable assurances" that all transactions are properly au-
thorized. 7 "The purpose of the internal controls provision is to ensure
that issuers use accepted methods of accounting when recording eco-
nomic transactions or protecting assets.""'
Specifically, the FCPA requires corporate accountability by
making reasonable assurances that, inter alia:
(i) transactions are executed in accordance with man-
agement's general or specific authorization;
(ii) transactions are recorded as necessary (I) to permit
the preparation of financial statements in conform-
ity with generally accepted accounting principles or
any other criteria applicable to such statements,
and (II) to maintain accountability for assets;
(iii) access to company assets is permitted only in accor-
dance with management's general or specific au-
thorization; and
(iv) the recorded accountability for assets is compared
with existing assets at reasonable intervals and ap-
83 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A).
84 Deming, supra note 86, at 1.
85 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(7)(2004).
86 Perkel, supra note 3, at 689; see also DONALD R. CRUVER, COMPLYING WITH THE
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 14-17 (ABA Sec. of Business Law, ed. American
Bar Association, 2d. ed. 1999).
87 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B)(2004). "Reasonable assurances" are measured against
the reasonable detail standard. 15 U.S.C. § 78(b)(7).
8 Perkel, supra note 3, at 689 (citing Deming, supra note 82, at 3).
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propriate action is taken with respect to any
differences.a8
The "reasonable detail" and -reasonable assurance" standards
on record-keeping and internal control were criticized by the business
community as exacting overly stringent constraints on their ability to
conduct business. Subsequently, Congress adopted a "prudent person"
standard for the amount of disclosure required by the FCPA.9 0 The
requirement has, therefore, developed a "level of detail and degree of
assurance in record-keeping that would satisfy prudent officials in the
conduct of their own affairs."91
In terms of enforcement, the SEC and the Justice Department
share duties under the FCPA, "where the SEC prosecutes civil viola-
tions of the accounting and anti-bribery provisions as applied to issu-
ers," and "the Department of Justice prosecutes civil violations by
domestic concerns."9 2 The Department of Justice, however, "has exclu-
sive jurisdiction in regard to criminal prosecutions, whether by a do-
mestic concern or an issuer."93
"As it now stands, the FCPA requires companies to keep accu-
rate records and maintain a system of internal controls, and outlaws
the practice of bribing foreign officials and other categories of recipi-
ents for the purpose of obtaining a business benefit. " ' Because of the
FCPA's success in achieving the government's aims, the U.S. has pres-
sured other nations to institute similar anti-corruption initiatives.9 5
International Efforts at Adopting the FCPA
At the behest of the U.S., which encouraged the preventing of
corruption globally, thirty-five nations signed the OECD Convention
in 1997, after a lengthy process that began three years earlier.' The
Convention, like the FCPA, "requires that all participating parties
criminalize the bribery of foreign officials, outline appropriate sanc-
tions for violations, and agree to extradite those charged with a brib-
ery offense." 7 Accounting and record-keeping provisions of the
15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B).
George & Lacey, supra note 8, at 562.
91 Id.
9 J. Lee Johnson, A Global Economy and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Some
Facts Worth Knowing, 63 Mo. L. REV. 979, 987 (1998).
93 Id. at 987.
94 Perkel, supra note 3, at 687.
' Manweiller & Schwartz, supra note 73, at 67.
96 Rubin, supra note 65, at 283-87.
97 Perkel, supra note 3, at 704; see Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development, Bribery Convention: Steps Taken and Planned Future Action, at
httpi/www.oecd.org/dataoecd/50/33/1827022.pdf (last visited Dec. 16, 2003).
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Convention were similar to those adopted by the FCPA in its 1998
amendment. 98 Argentina, a non-OECD member, signed the Conven-
tion in 2001, but has yet to ratify it, although ratification is expected in
the near future. 9 9
The Organization of American States ("OAS") also adopted an
anti-corruption regulation in its Inter-American Convention Against
Corruption, which criminalizes transnational bribery in the Western
Hemisphere.1 0 0 The OAS Convention seeks to "prevent, detect, pun-
ish and eradicate corruption in the performance of public functions,"
and targets both the bribe-giver and the bribe-receiver, hence surpass-
ing the prohibitions contained within the OECD Convention, which
merely targets the conduct of the bribe-givers.' 0 1
Like the OECD Convention, signatory nations are to maintain"systems for registering the income, assets and liabilities of persons
who perform public functions in certain posts as specified by law and,
where appropriate, for making such registrations public."'10 2 Its provi-
sions, however, do not go as far as the FCPA's in attempting to estab-
lish sound accounting principles in foreign transactions.
Interestingly, both the OECD and OAS Conventions were
modeled in part after the FCPA, and "these multilateral organizations
were able to take advantage of the successes and failures of the origi-
nal U.S. legislation and its amendments."1 0' 3 As a signatory to both
Conventions, and having ratified the OAS Convention, 10 4 Argentina is
required to implement the proscribed measures. In practice, though,
Argentina and its government has been unable to properly address its
issues of graft and corruption in its own government circles.
98 OECD Convention, supra note 81. at Art. 8 (discussing the OECD's latest ef-
forts to combat international corruption through accounting procedures).
99 Conference, The Experts Roundtable: A Hemispheric Approach to Combating
Corruption, 15 Am. U. INT'L L. REv. 759, 769 n. 5 (2000).
1oo Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, Mar. 29, 1996, OAS, 35 I.L.M.
724, at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Treaties/6-58.html (last visited Sept.
19, 2004) [hereinafter OAS Convention] The OAS has thirty-five member states,
all from the western hemisphere (Cuba has been excluded since 1962); see also
Perkel, supra note 3, at 705.
101 George & Lacey, supra note 8, at 564.
102 OAS Convention, supra note 104, at Art. 111(4).
103 George & Lacey, supra note 8, at 558.
104 Organization of American States, Signatures and Ratifications, at http://www.
oas.org/main/main.asp?sLang=& sLinkH rtp://www.oas.org/juridico/english/
fightcur.html (last visited Dec. 17, 2003). ("Pursuant to the provisions of Article
XVIII of the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, the Government of
Argentina appointed the Ministry of Foreigner Affairs, to serve as the Central Au-
thority for the Republic of Argentina.").
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On a global scale, the United Nations recently sponsored an
initiative to curtail corruption in its U.N. Convention against Corrup-
tion.' °5 The agreement criminalizes bribery, money laundering, and
embezzlement of public funds, and requires countries to take steps to
prevent corruption. Over ninety-five countries have signed the new
law.
The Convention, however, neither requires signatory countries
to enact new anti-corruption laws, nor does it mandate sanctions for
violating the pact. Critics also note that the Convention does not
clearly define what it seeks to prevent, labeling it as anti-corruption
rhetoric. In essence, though it is difficult to measure the Convention's
impact at present, what is clear is that without vigorous enforcement,
investigation, or the ability to support genuine compliance, the Con-
vention's authority will not reach the level of success that has resulted
from the FCPA.
Lastly, the World Bank'0 6 has attempted to control fraud and
corruption by evaluating corruption levels when designing develop-
ment assistance strategies and implementing aid projects."0 ' In fact,
the World Bank has established an independent audit program and
expanded personnel oversight of its procurement processes, initiating
a multi-faceted program designed to combat corruption in its funded
projects while helping nations to reduce internal corruption and sup-
porting international anti-corruption programs.'O8 The World Bank's
steps in addressing the corruption issue in its loan projects have well
exceeded the efforts taken by the IMF at present. The IMF would be
'( United Nations Convention against Corruption, at httpJ/www.unodc.org/
unodc/erime convention corruption.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2004).
'' World Bank Institute, About the World Bank Group, History, at httpi//www.
worldbank.org/htm]Vextdr/about/history.htm (last visited Dec. 15, 2003); see also
George & Lacey, supra note 8, at 575 ("The Bank stimulates productive invest-
ment in developing countries by, inter alia, lending capital to countries for infra-
structure projects, financing banking and corporate reform, and engaging in other
projects intended to help the poor and unemployed in developing economy
nations.").
107 Rubin, supra note 65, at 276-78 (describing the efforts being made by interna-
tional financial institutions).
108 Perkel, supra note 3, at 687; see also World Bank Institute, Governance &
Anti-corruption Overview & Strategy, at http-//web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EX-
TERNAUEXTABOUTUS/0,,contentMDK=20040558-menuPK34559-pagePIK
34542-piPK:36600-theSitePK-29708,00.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2003) (promot-
ing the World Bank's strategy to combat corruption); Alejandro Posadas, Combat-
ing Corruption Under International Law, 10 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 345, 395-
408 (2000) (illustrating international organizations' programs to combat
corruption).
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wise to follow the World Bank's lead in identifying corruption as a
problem that should be dealt with immediately and appropriately.
Incorporating the FCPA as IMF Lending Policy
"A legacy of the centralized style of government handed down
by the conquistadors, corruption has undermined Latin America's po-
tential for centuries." ' 9 This is common knowledge to most govern-
ments and institutions of the world, and should have been known to
the IMF when it made the decision to provide financial assistance to
Argentina. In fact, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell bluntly urged
Argentina in 2002, then the third largest economy in Latin America, to
address its institutional flaws and to discourage, inter alia, excess pub-
lic sector borrowing, politicized judicial systems, a lack of trans-
parency in government activities, and, ultimately, corruption.110
Although Argentina is a signatory member of the OECD and OAS Con-
ventions, its roots of corruption run so deep that many of its leaders
are not willing to abandon the spoils system, despite its evils, thereby
allowing illegal financial practices to continue unchecked.'
The IMF took a tough stance with Argentina throughout its re-
negotiations. The IMF's subsequent bailout, however, either because
of its own institutional pressure or from U.S. insistence that it provide
new money, confirmed that the IMF's position on eradicating corrup-
tion was not solid. The IMF's decision to lend shows that it is commit-
ted neither to any meaningful policy change, nor to any credible
promises of corruption reform in its debtor nations.
Indeed, leading economists have demanded that detailed re-
ports, audits, and opinions covering IMF programs with debtor coun-
tries be published. 1 2 Even though prolonged studies and consultation
with outside experts are not always possible in a rapidly developing
crisis, preserving better records of the process can serve as a founda-
tion for assuring the success of its programs and eventual repayment.
For these reasons, the IMF itself should look to the FCPA as a
model in forming its anti-corruption standards, indeed using those
principles as a condition to the loans themselves, especially where bor-
rower countries have not proven a capacity to harness corruption in
their own governments. The IMF's current guidelines, though ac-
knowledging the problem of government corruption, do nothing to
guarantee that its funds will be used for stated purposes. The FCPA's
record-keeping and internal controls provisions, without a doubt, in-
clude the necessary language for the IMF to manage the path of its
109 Moffett, supra note 4, at Al.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Paddock, supra note 12, at 180.
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loaned funds. With a few changes, its eventual implementation by the
IMF would do much to stifle the corruption inherent in the countries
that seek its financial assistance.
For one, the applicable FCPA provisions apply to "issuers" of
registered securities under the SEC. In contrast, the IMF should ap-
ply its FCPA-like anti-corruption regulation to all "receivers," that is,
to those individuals or organizations that receive funds flowing from
the initial disbursement by the IMF to the debtor country's central
bank.
Moreover, the IMF should most certainly adopt the "reasonable
detail" requirement of the record-keeping provision. Here, individuals
or organizations to which the government will disburse IMF-originat-
ing funds to further the objectives of the loan assistance program,
should register with and provide information to the IMF, sufficient to
satisfy "prudent IMF officials and members" in the conduct of their
own affairs. The benefit of this provision is the assurance that receiv-
ers are documented and readily identifiable when funds are misman-
aged or lost through graft or corruption. It also lessens the
opportunity to falsify records to conceal improper or unauthorized
activities.
Correspondingly, the IMIF should also require receivers to de-
vise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls that will
provide "reasonable assurances" that all transactions concerning IMF-
originating funds are properly authorized. The purpose of the internal
controls provision, as with the FCPA, is to ensure that receivers use
accepted methods of accounting when recording transactions or pro-
tecting assets.
This solidly establishes debtor accountability by making rea-
sonable assurances that, inter alia, transactions are executed in accor-
dance with the IMF and the debtor country's goals in mind;
transactions are recorded as necessary to permit the preparation of
financial statements in conformity with generally accepted accounting
principles or any other criteria applicable to such statements, and to
maintain accountability for assets; access to IMF-originating assets is
permitted only in accordance with the debtor country's general or spe-
cific authorization; and the recorded accountability for IMF assets is
compared with existing assets at reasonable intervals and appropriate
action is taken with respect to any differences.
Technology can also be a valuable tool in combating corruption
under and FCPA-like model. Requiring posting of a receiver's personal
or organizational financial information on the web11 3 can support
transparency, as the Internet gives more people unprecedented access
to information. In an interdependent, mutually reinforcing manner,
113 Moffett, supra note 4, at A6.
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technology-driven openness and transparency can help to cement the
success of IMF programs, and can even foster the development of dem-
ocratic institutions.1 14
The theme in adopting these FCPA-like approaches is to estab-
lish accountability in the handling of IMF-originating funds to fulfill
program goals, and to assure that IMF members will receive repay-
ment. Because of the enormous amounts of money that may be in-
volved and the numbers of people that may come in contact with this
capital, however, some will criticize this approach as impractical to en-
force. Useful here, though, is the approach adopted by the OECD Con-
vention to provide for Mutual Legal Assistance. 115
Nations like Argentina, though not entirely an emerging mar-
ket, will find it difficult to enforce the anti-corruption safeguards im-
posed by the IMF's model policy. As a result, IMF member countries,
undoubtedly among the wealthiest in the world, should provide along
with its financial assistance programs the guarantee of providing mu-
tual legal assistance in enforcing and overseeing the proper mainte-
nance of records and accounting practices as it concerns IMF-
originating funds. In fact, it would behoove IMF member countries to
do so in order to assure themselves of repayment of these loans.
Another criticism that will materialize against the IMF's im-
plementation of an FCPA-like anti-corruption standard is that the
IMF should not condition its financial assistance upon arbitrary stipu-
lations which will benefit the IMF more than the borrower country. To
some, however, the IMF already acts as a vehicle for leveraging foreign
policy, notably that of the U.S. 1 6 Currently, the IMF limits debtor
country flexibility by demanding the opening of telecommunications
and energy markets, impositions for which the U.S. is notorious. In
contrast, the IMF should primarily push for the eradication of corrup-
tion in debtor country markets, in order for IMF members to more ef-
114 Steven R. Salbu, Information Technology in the War Against International
Bribery and Corruption: The Next Frontier of Institutional Reform, 38 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 67, 93 (2001) ("Like technology, transparency supports the continued main-
tenance of a liberal democracy. Democracy's liberties and freedom then continue
to bolster openness and transparency.").
115 OECD Convention, supra note 81, at Art. 9. ("Each Party shall, under the ful-
lest extent possible under its laws and relevant treaties and arrangements, pro-
vide prompt and effective legal assistance to another Party for the purpose of
criminal investigations and proceedings brought by a Party concerning offences
within the scope of this Convention and for non-criminal proceedings within the
scope of this convention brought by a party against a legal person. The requested
Party shall inform the requesting Party, without delay, of any additional informa-
tion or documents needed to support the request for assistance and, where re-
quested, of the status and outcome for the request for assistance.").
116 Paddock, supra note 12, at 181.
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fectively compete economically in those debtor countries, and to lessen
the risk that debtor countries will need further financial assistance.
The FCPA model approach imposes conditions that will indubitably
help all parties concerned in the long term.
As it stands, the IMF's programs are difficult to judge objec-
tively because of the lack of transparency in the decision-making and
implementation process.' 1 7 The IMF executive board should consult
with anti-corruption experts and make operations public so that objec-
tive criticism and review can take place."-'
Furthermore, the IMF frequently uses teams that have little or
no experience with the debtor country or its institutions.1 1 9 By prac-
ticing due diligence through monitoring of the borrower country and
submitting regular reports to the Board, 12 1 the risk of corruption as it
concerns IMF-originating funds is minimized, and the success of an
FCPA-like regulation is further assured.1 2 1 In essence, the IMF
should have its staff ensure that receivers are aware of and are com-
plying with this policy. 2 2
Insufficient regulation of corruption leads to irresponsibility in
the public and private sectors.' 23 When corruption is allowed to run
amok, the poor are left to pay for IMF bailouts that often simply serve
to enable wealthy investors to shuttle capital out of the country.124
Part of the tragedy, though, is that the IMF and the United States do
not practice what they preach. 125 While the institution and its member
countries vow to combat corruption in places like Argentina, they act,
117 Id. at 180. The lack of transparency and secrecy in the organization makes it
impossible to objectively evaluate IMF performance; see also The International
Monetary Fund, Code of Good Practices on TransparencN in Monetar, and Finan-
cial Policies, at httpJ/www.imf.org/external/np/mae/mft/sup/partl.htm (last vis-
ited Dec. 16, 2003) (identifying desirable transparency practices for central banks
in their conduct of monetary policy and for central banks and other financial agen-
cies in their conduct of financial policies).
118 Paddock, supra note 12, at 180.
119 Id. at 181.
120 Gary M. Brown, Exchange Act Registration and Reporting: What a Public Corn-
panY Should Know, in Nuts and Bolts of Securities Law 159-62 (1997) (citing
FCPA compliance as one of many requirements for public companies): see also IMF
Articles, supra note 10, at Art. VIII, Sec. 5 (mandating the Furnishing of Informa-
tion) ("The Fund may require members to furnish it with such information as it
deems necessary for its activities, including, as the minimum necessary for the
effective discharge of the Fund's duties, national data on [member countries].").
121 Perkel, supra note 3, at 708.
122 Id.
123 Paddock, supra note 12, at 182.
124 Id.
125 Id at 183.
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rather, to open markets that have long been corroded by illegal
practices.
CONCLUSION
An Argentine mayor recently proclaimed that, "we're trying to
let light into government's dark corners."'26 People in Argentina
"learned long ago to expect the worst from government," yet sophisti-
cated entities like the IMF continue to pursue fool-hardy objectives
without adequately addressing issues of corruption.' 2 7
The IMF, as evidenced in its Articles of Agreement, was never
meant to comprehensively address corruption in its loans. 2 ' This soft
stance on corruption, as a result, plainly contributed to Argentina's
financial decline, which will have the effect of reducing the flow of for-
eign capital to Argentina in the near future.
The IMF's soft stance on corruption also poses several future
problems. For one, it confirms to the Argentine leadership that the
IMF is unwilling to pursue substantial reforms in corruption. This en-
courages further political corruption, making any significant reform
practically impossible. Consequently, by making reform unachievable,
the IMF perpetuates poverty and economic instability. The IMF's fail-
ure in Argentina also sends a message to the leaders of other borrower
countries negotiating with the IMF that issues of corruption reform
will be passed on to subsequent governments, so long as lucrative mar-
kets remain open for business. Yet, corruption reform is the only way
for countries to generate income on a permanent basis.
As a result, skepticism has grown about the intentions of the
IMF and U.S. for the region.' 2 9 This has occurred because dominant
Board members, such as the U.S., in complete disregard of government
criminal activity, have pushed the IMF's loan packages to Argentina,
among others. Accordingly, the world's disaffected are increasingly
making their voices heard: "People have had it."'3 ° Essentially, the
IMF has become a symbol of globalization, frustration, and the senti-
ment that the government is not interested in the welfare of the peo-
ple.' 3 ' In fact, in Argentina, the poor and working classes demand
126 Moffett, supra note 4, at Al.
127 Id.
128 Jerome I. Levinson, Repressive Regimes Shouldn't Get a Loan, WASH. POST,
June 15, 1998, at A23.
129 Luhnow, supra note 65, at A15.
130 Cordoba, supra note 5, at 21 ("A weak economy, thanks in part to the recent
U.S. slowdown, accounts for some of the simmering anger.").
131 Id.
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that the government not renew its debt-payment agreement with the
IMF. 132
In contrast, the United States' FCPA has energized U.S. firms
and the U.S. government to pursue a level playing field in business
and business transactions.1 3 3 As a result of the FCPA's success in the
U.S., other governments and international organizations have also re-
quired accounting and transparency in connection with public procure-
ment, and have taken steps to strengthen civil society.1" 4
Unfortunately, the problems inherent in developing an effec-
tive international anti-corruption regime include the practice of cor-
ruption itself, which in some governments has been embedded for
centuries. 135 Notwithstanding, if it is to have any success in future
financial assistance programs, the IMF must confront the reality of
the need to design and implement an effective anti-corruption policy as
a condition to its loan agreements.1 36 Indeed, the IMF would be wise
to adopt a model like the FCPA to avoid future disasters, as occurred
in Argentina.
132 Id. -Argentina, a staunch U.S. ally in the 1990's. nowadays defends warmer
relations with Cuban dictator Fidel Castro and Venezuela's populist leftist Hugo
Chavez as a result of popular disillusionment with the IMF and Washington."
"a Bruce Zagaris and Shaila Lakhani Ohri. The Emergence of an International
Enforcement Regime on Transnational Corruption in the Americas, 30 LAw &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 53 (1999).
134 Id.
135 Id. These include "low salaries for government officials, the need or desire to
supplement the modest salaries of officials, the use of clever business practices to
mask the receipt of illicit payments, and a fear that leaning on transnational brib-
ery may cause a loss of business, are among the many problems that restrict politi-
cal will."
13 Id.
